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Abstract
Background: Delay in calling emergency medical services following stroke limits access to early treatment that can reduce
disability. Emergency medical services contact is mostly initiated by stroke witnesses (often relatives), rather than stroke
patients. This study explored appraisal and behavioural factors that are potentially important in influencing witness
behaviour in response to stroke.
Methods and Findings: Semi-structured interviews with 26 stroke witnesses were transcribed and theory-guided content
analysed was undertaken based on the Common Sense Self-Regulation Model (appraisal processes) and Theory Domains
Framework (behavioural determinants). Response behaviours were often influenced by heuristics-guided appraisal (i.e.
mental rules of thumb). Some witnesses described their responses to the situation as ‘automatic’ and ‘instinctive’, rather
than products of deliberation. Potential behavioural influences included: environmental context and resources (e.g. time of
day), social influence (e.g. prompts from patients) and beliefs about consequences (e.g. 999 accesses rapid help). Findings
are based on retrospective accounts and need further verification in prospective studies.
Conclusions: Witnesses play a key role in patient access to emergency medical services. Factors that potentially influence
witnesses’ responses to stroke were identified and could inform behavioural interventions and future research. Interventions
might benefit from linking automatic/instinctive threat perceptions with deliberate appraisal of stroke symptoms,
prompting action to call emergency medical services.
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Introduction
Delay in calling emergency medical services (EMS) following
stroke onset is an important factor that prevents patients accessing
hyperacute stroke care and thrombolytic therapy, an intervention
which can have a beneficial impact on patient outcome [1]. Delay
times range from 3 to 6 hours [2] reducing the chances of optimal
recovery for the majority of stroke patients. EMS are typically
contacted by witnesses of stroke, not stroke patients [3]. EMS
phone calls for stroke are initiated by 2–7% of patients, with
remaining contacts made by witnesses including family members
(,41–75%), friends (,4–20%), or medical/care personnel (,13–
42%) [3–7]. Nevertheless, most research to date has focused on the
patient rather than witness factors that determine response
behaviour following stroke. However, different factors might
influence witnesses’ compared with patients’ responses. It has
been suggested that family members and friends should be
targeted for interventions as they are likely to act on behalf of the
patient when stroke occurs [2]. Past public education campaigns
[8,9] included stroke witnesses as a target population, but overall
most interventions have been found to be only minimally effective
[2,10,11]. Such interventions would benefit from a sound un-
derstanding of factors that influence witnesses’ response behaviour
to stroke.
Despite the advantages of theory-based research and interven-
tions, [12] the field of help-seeking behaviour often lacks rigorous
methods [13] including an explicit theoretical basis [14,15] and
systematic intervention development [10]. Descriptive theories of
the patient process in seeking medical care outline a number of
distinct stages, [16–18] including one stage of situational appraisal
where a health threat is detected (appraisal stage) and another
stage where response behaviours are selected (behavioural stage).
Our study explored factors and processes that might influence
witness responses to stroke by examining witnesses’ interviews of
their stroke experience using two theoretical frameworks that
provide explanatory accounts of appraisal and behavioural factors.
First, the Common Sense Self-Regulation Model [19] was
selected as it provides a detailed explanatory account of the
processes involved in making sense of a health threat. According to
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the model, individuals faced with a health threat form a mental
representation which reflects the individuals’ understanding of the
illness. These illness representations include aspects of the illness
such as its label (identity), its time-course (timeline), its effects on
the person (consequences), its controllability (personal control) and
its cause. The Common Sense Self-Regulation Model has
previously informed research on health care seeking behaviour
[20]. Second, the Theory Domains Framework [21] was selected
as it provides a broad and inclusive evidence-based account of all
relevant factors outlined in current theories of behaviour. This
framework comprises 12 domains of theory-based explanations for
behaviour resulting from a comprehensive review of behavioural
theories and an expert consensus approach grouping theoretical
constructs by commonality.
Methods
Design
Semi-structured interview study with a purposive sample to
represent the range of response times from the onset of stroke
symptoms to health services contact (i.e. .1 hour and ,1 hour
following stroke onset), based on self-report verified with medical
staff in cases of uncertainty. Health service contact included
telephoning EMS (i.e. dialling 999 [999 is UK equivalent to USA
911, and many other countries]), telephoning the primary care
physician office (i.e. general practice surgery) and presenting to the
emergency department (ED). Witnesses were recruited between
April 2009 and January 2010 from three stroke units in north east
England. Individuals reported by patients as having initiated
health services contact leading to hospital admission on their
behalf were initially approached by stroke research nurses, either
on hospital site when accompanying patients, or via phone. Details
of those interested were passed on to the research team.
Procedure
Semi-structured interviews using a topic guide were conducted
to explore witnesses’ reasons for responding to acute stroke.
Interviews covered appraisal (‘‘What did you think was happening/had
happened?’’), behavioural (‘‘What did you decide to do about the
symptoms?’’), cognitive (‘‘What were important factors in making that
decision?’’), and emotional (‘‘What were your main concerns/worries at the
time?’’) factors. Interviews took place in witnesses’ homes and were
audio-recorded, transcribed and anonymised. This study received
ethical approval from the National Health Service (NHS) Sunder-
land Research Ethics Committee (REC08/H0904/104). All
participants provided written, informed consent prior to partici-
pation.
Analysis
Theory-guided content analysis to examine the appraisal and
behavioural factors relevant for stroke responses was based on the
two theoretical frameworks. Appraisal factor codings were based
on the Common Sense Self-Regulation Model (CS-SRM) [19].
The concepts derived from this model for the purpose of this study
are illness representations, including: ‘symptoms/consequences’
(i.e. a descriptive account of the perceived symptoms or
consequences of symptoms), ‘identity/cause’ (i.e. an interpreting
account of the perceived symptoms in terms of the underlying
condition or cause), ‘cure/control’ (i.e. possibility of curing/
controlling symptoms or illness), and ‘timeline’ (i.e. duration or
length of symptoms or illness). In addition the Common Sense
Self-Regulation Model includes the concept of heuristics, defined
as strategies and mental rules of thumb used to respond to illness
indicators; these were coded [22,23].
Behavioural factor codings were based on the Theory Domains
Framework [21], which included the following domains: knowl-
edge; skills; social role & identity; beliefs about capabilities; beliefs
about consequences; motivation and goals; decision processes;
environmental context; social influences; emotion; behavioural
regulation; and past behaviour.
Codings were made in NVivo9 for (a) the appraisal process, and
(b) behavioural factors in a two-step process. in step 1, sections of
the transcript were allocated to theoretical variables as outlined
above. Transcript sections could be allocated to several constructs
if these embraced multiple aspects or meanings. In step 2,
theoretical variables reported to influence response behaviours
were selected. Response behaviour was defined as any overt and
observable behavioural response to witnessing stroke. Behavioural
influence was determined by direct verbal reports (e.g. ‘…because
of factor X I did behaviour Y’), coincidence (e.g. participants
reporting a variable were more likely to engage in a particular
response), or logic (e.g. perceptions logically prevented a certain
response). Construct allocation and links to response behaviour
were coded by one author (SUD) and double checked by a second
author (VAS). Disagreements (12% and 7% of step 1 and 2
codings respectively) were resolved in discussion with a third
author (FFS).
Results
Twenty-six stroke witnesses (20 female) were recruited#14 days
post stroke with the help of nurses at three participating stroke
units in North-East England. Witnesses’ relationships to the
patients were: wife/husband (n=14), son/daughter (n=9), grand-
daughter (n=1), formal care-giver (n=1) and acquaintance (n=1).
All strokes occurred in the patient’s home, except one that
occurred in a supermarket. Most contacts with EMS (n=13) and
some to primary care physician offices (n=2) were made within 1
hour of symptom onset. For those who responded after 1 hour,
contact included EMS calls (n = 7), primary care physician (n=3)
and ED visits (n=1). All variables reported in the next section were
identified as influencing witness’ response behaviours.
Appraisal Processes
Symptoms/Consequences. ‘Symptoms/consequences’ re-
fers to witnesses’ perceptions of the symptoms and consequences
of a patient’s stroke. All symptoms/consequences perceived by
witnesses were observable and influenced some witness responses
(‘‘…his face was funny but all down his right side [he] couldn’t move it. So I
[…] phoned the doctor’’, W02, wife, GP,1 h [Abbreviations
following quotes indicate: (a) witness number, (b) relation to stroke
patient, (c) time between onset of symptoms and type of health
service contacted.]), albeit most witnesses reported additional
influences (outlined below). Perceptions of symptoms/conse-
quences also guided how witnesses responded to stroke (‘‘I didn’t
phone up and say: ‘My Gran’s had a stroke’ I just said: ‘My Gran isn’t
moving’.’’ W24, granddaughter, 999,1 h).
Identity/Cause. ‘Identity/cause’ is the label (e.g. stroke) or
perceived cause of observed symptoms. One third of witnesses
reported successfully recognising the identity/cause of observed
symptoms as stroke, often instantaneously, which frequently led to
an immediate response (‘‘I knew straight away that she had had a stroke
so I phoned straight away the ambulance’’ W03, daughter, 999,1 h).
One third suspected stroke and a further third failed to recognise
stroke altogether. Failure to recognise stroke tended to be
associated with the reporting of alternative explanations such as
‘shock’ or ‘food poisoning’, often accompanied by more varied and
delayed response patterns.
Factors Influencing Witness Response to Stroke
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Cure/Control. ‘Cure/control’ represents witnesses’ percep-
tions about the ability to cure or control stroke symptoms.
Witnesses often perceived a lack of personal capability to
contribute to cure/control patients’ symptoms, which commonly
led to a help-seeking response, indicating the perceived ability of
health professionals to be able to cure/control symptoms (‘‘I mean I
couldn’t cope with him the way he was [unilateral weakness and speech
problems] and I said: ‘[…] I am phoning the doctor’’’ W02, wife,
999,1 h). Lack of cure/control was often expressed in terms of
fear of death, but none of the witnesses reported perceiving death
as inevitable.
Heuristics. Many witnesses used heuristics (i.e. mental rules
of thumb) to evaluate the observed symptoms. Heuristic-guided
information processing seemed to facilitate both the recognition of
a health threat (i.e. appraisal stage) and subsequent responses (i.e.
behavioural stage). The ‘discrepancy heuristic’ includes a compar-
ison process between the witness’ expectations and actual
perceptions of the patient, for example based on expected and
perceived health status. Large discrepancies typically lead to the
detection of ‘something being wrong’ (‘‘…she wasn’t her normal self’’,
W25, daughter, EMS,1 h), in some cases immediately, and was
often coupled with an instant response (‘‘I could tell straight away […]
that there was something wrong, as soon as I came in I said ‘I’ll phone an
ambulance’’’, W09, wife, EMS,1 h). In addition, expectation-
perception discrepancies could be detected in terms of behaviour,
where witnesses reported patients behaving untypically (‘‘…if he
tells me to ring, it must be serious’’ W26, wife, EMS.1 h), prompted
the inference of a problem, and in some cases a swift response.
Further heuristics influencing responses were the ‘comparison
heuristic’ including self-comparison (‘‘… we both had it [food
poisoning] I thought well I’ve got it […] so we put it off until the next day’’
W04, wife, GP.1 h) and stroke prototype comparison (‘‘…she
doesn’t have high blood pressure; she eats a very healthy diet, […] she doesn’t
smoke, […]. So yeah, it came as a surprise to me.’’ W21, husband,
GP.1 h).
Behavioural Determinants of Stroke Responses
Knowledge. Here ‘knowledge’ refers to symptom knowledge
(i.e. knowing the symptoms indicating stroke), response knowledge
(i.e. knowing how to respond to stroke) and treatment knowledge
(i.e. knowing the available treatments for stroke). Symptom
knowledge varied greatly and, when present, could lead to stroke
recognition and a rapid response (‘‘…when I got closer I realised she
had had a stroke because her mouth had dropped and she couldn’t get her words
out so straight away I phoned 999’’, W03, daughter, 999,1 h). Most
witnesses who recognised stroke also contacted EMS within an
hour (‘‘…I thought if dad has had a stroke I know that within a certain length
of time you’ve got to get medical assistance’’, W22, daughter, 999,1 h),
with those only suspecting stroke often delaying an EMS response.
Treatment knowledge for acute stroke was generally absent
regardless of symptom and response knowledge levels.
Limitations of knowledge as a factor influencing response
behaviours emerged from witnesses accounts. A lack of stroke
knowledge could co-occur with an appropriate response (‘‘I don’t
know very much about strokes, but I knew that he needed help’’ W17, wife,
999,1 h). Knowledge could also be perceived as irrelevant if the
situation itself warranted an emergency response, independent of
stroke recognition (‘‘…it seemed obvious to me, there was definitely
something wrong, whether it was a stroke or not I had to get the ambulance’’
W10, husband, 999.1 h [Response coded as .1 h as stroke
occurred during the night, witness responded immediately
following encounter of symptoms.]). Knowledge misconceptions
were often reported to delay immediate EMS responses, including
misconceptions on symptom placement (‘‘…[for] a full stroke the
mouth would probably be down’’ W23, son, 999.1 h), recognition (‘‘I
recognised the TV [advertised symptoms and] said: ‘Can you put your
arms up?’ … He says: ‘I’m putting my arms up’. I’m thinking: ‘Well it cannot
be a stroke’’’ W04, wife, GP.1 h), or symptom patterns (‘‘…the eye
goes, the mouth goes, the arm goes limp, - that’s when you do something’’
W06, daughter, GP.1 h). Misconceptions of the EMS remit also
seemed to prevent swift service engagement (‘‘[EMS are] obviously for
people [that have] been rushed in with car accidents, or heart attacks’’, W05,
daughter, 999.1 h).
Social influence. ‘Social influence’ incorporates social inter-
actions influencing stroke responses and some witnesses reported
responding to stroke following patient prompting, (‘‘…he just said:
‘Help me’, and that’s when I called for the ambulance’’ W7, son,
999,1 h). Other prompts from health care professionals were
mostly followed regardless of whether EMS contact was
recommended (‘‘[The GP] says: ‘Put the phone down, dial 999’ […],
so I did that’’, W02, wife, GP,1 h) or not (‘‘…[The GP] just said to
take him straight up to A&E’’ W11, wife, A&E.1 h). In some cases
behavioural decisions were negotiated between witness and patient
(‘‘…[the patient said] ‘Oh don’t bother with the ambulance […] I’ll be okay’,
I wasn’t having none of that, enough is enough’’, W10, husband,
EMS.1 h) and several witnesses took patient wishes into
consideration when making the decision (‘‘My Mum doesn’t like
a fuss made and she was like: ‘Don’t you dare call the doctor or an ambulance’.
So I rang NHS Direct’’ W19, daughter, 999.1 h). Perceived norms
for accessing NHS help also influenced responses in a few cases (‘‘I
rang the health line which they did tell you to ring first before you dial 999’’
W15, wife, 999,1 h).
Beliefs about consequences. ‘Beliefs about consequences’
are witnesses’ expectations of what would follow if a particular
response was performed. Beliefs about consequences associated
with a swift response included: negative outcome expectations in
the absence of immediate medical care (‘‘…the reason I rang for the
ambulance to get her into hospital was I thought: ‘Well if we leave it, it might
get worse’’’ W05, daughter, 999,1 h), response speed (‘‘I just picked
up the phone, 999, it was quick, seconds. Just for quickness’’, W12, wife,
999,1 h), or a combination of the two (‘‘I thought he needed the help
straight away rather than ring the doctors and whatever I just thought I’ve got to
do that [dial 999]’’, W09, wife, 999,1 h). Beliefs about con-
sequences of a response associated with delay were: confirmation
of stroke suspicion (‘‘I thought it was possible that it was a stroke, but
that’s why I phone NHS direct just to confirm’’ W16, wife, 999,1 h),
obtaining advice (‘‘What I did was I said: ‘I will phone the surgery and get
advice’, I thought maybe from the nurse’’ W11, wife, A&E.1 h), or
inconveniencing the health service (‘‘they [EMS] are such a busy
service and you think: ‘If I can help by getting my Mum there and not have to
trouble them, they are for somebody who hasn’t got transport or hasn’t got
family near’’’ W06, daughter, GP.1 h).
Decision processes. ‘Decision process’ is the process
through which witnesses arrived at a response following witnessing
stroke. The behavioural decision-making process included auto-
matic/instinctive as well as reflective/deliberative decision making
elements and some evidence of both instinctive and deliberative
decision-making processes influencing response behaviours
emerged, which could lead to swift EMS contact (‘‘I think I made
[the decision to call EMS] straight away. I must admit I did think ring the
doctor and then I thought: ‘No I’m going to ring an ambulance’’’ W09, wife,
999,1 h) but not in all cases (‘‘… my first instinct was that it’s been
a stroke but I couldn’t have dialled 999 because she would have lost her
temper’’, W19, daughter, 999.1 h).
Motivation and goals. ‘Motivation and goals’ are witnesses’
reasons for performing a particular response. A frequently
reported motivation for a particular response was the goal of
getting help quickly, which almost always associated with swift
Factors Influencing Witness Response to Stroke
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EMS contact (‘‘…the one thing that I wanted to do was just get somebody
here quick’’, W22, daughter, 999,1 h). There was some suggestion
that witnesses went through a selection process where response
options were considered and selected.
Environmental context. ‘Environmental context’ includes
influences of witnesses’ physical context on their response
behaviour. Environmental context influencing witnesses’ response
included time of day, mostly in cases where GP surgery contact
was initially contemplated. If the stroke was detected past/before
surgery opening hours some witnesses contacted EMS instead (‘‘I
then said: ‘I am going to get the paramedics’, because it was at night’’ W08,
acquaintance, 999.1 h), but for most respondents this was
associated with initial non-EMS contacts (‘‘I thought it was too late
to phone them so I thought I’ll phone NHS direct’’ W16, wife, 999,1 h).
Past behavior. Past behaviour (‘‘I called 999 that time as well …
with her having the two previous strokes’’ W05, daughter, 999,1 h) was
reported by some witnesses as reasons for responses. Some
reported negative past experiences as a reason for a particular
responses (‘‘…I thought by the time I go through all this you know rigmarole
with the other one I’m just as quick dialling 999’’, wife, 999,1 h).
Emotion. ‘Emotion’ refers to witnesses’ affective reactions
following the witnessing of stroke. Affective reactions following the
witnessing of stroke were frequently reported as by-products of
witnesses’ appraisal and response processes, and seemed to
influence speed and performance (‘‘…it was a shock but I was sort
of in a daze really’’, W09, wife, EMS,1 h), or (recall of) the decision
making process (‘‘…well just panic. I don’t know what was going through
my mind because […] I really don’t know what went through my mind’’,
W11, wife, A&E.1 h).
Discussion
This study outlines multiple interrelated factors likely to
influence witnesses’ responses to stroke. Different processes and
determinants may result in similar response behaviours and some
influence of stroke appraisal and behavioural factors may operate
out of immediate awareness.
Heuristics seemed to guide information processing, often
regardless of symptom recognition, sometimes contributing to an
immediate response. As acute stroke is often a complex pre-
sentation, heuristics might play a crucial role in adaptively guiding
witness’ appraisal and response processes by ignoring redundant
information (e.g. loss of speech requires immediate medical
attention regardless of other symptoms). Complexity-reducing
mental shortcuts to behaviour might be used in rapid-onset high-
threat conditions such as stroke, as deliberation of all relevant
stimuli could lead to more harmful outcomes. Heuristics have been
shown to result in superior behavioural responses in a variety of
situations as compared to more complex processes [23] and may
partly explain findings in the delay literature, such as that less
severe strokes are associated with longer delay [24] and differential
delay patterns for different stroke strategies [25].
Equal proportions of witnesses identified, suspected or failed to
recognise stroke (one-third each respectively). Those failing to
recognise stroke often formed alternative conclusions about
symptom identities/causes. Once a health threat was detected,
increasingly elaborate mental representations of the patients’
health condition were formed. Illness representations seemed to
influence responses, with those typically not associated with an
emergency (e.g. food poisoning) potentially causing delays
compared to illness representations typically associated with
emergency (e.g. heart attack). Witnessing stroke is likely to lead
to a rapid instinctive appraisal and responses followed by more
elaborate processes taking additional factors into consideration.
This study might help to explain other common findings in the
stroke delay literature, such as the gap between stroke knowledge
and response behaviour [24,26]. Knowledge appeared to be
beneficial, but neither necessary nor sufficient factor to influence
appropriate responses for the following reasons:
1) Knowledge of symptoms might not lead to stroke recogni-
tion (e.g. a witness has factual knowledge of all symptoms
but fails to match knowledge with an occurring stroke in the
moment);
2) Stroke (or other serious illness) recognition might occur even
if witnesses have poor stroke knowledge (e.g. a witness only
knows a limited number of symptoms but encounters one of
these, recognises stroke and responds adequately);
3) Following stroke recognition, the appropriate response
might be unknown (e.g. a witness recognizes stroke, but
thinks it is right to contact the primary care physician
instead of EMS);
4) Knowledge effects might be masked by other factors with
potentially stronger influence on behaviour (e.g. a witness
recognizes stroke and the need to contact EMS, but delays
to avoid inconveniencing busy services).
Further research needs to explore the processes through which
knowledge influences responses, using explanatory frameworks
such as the Common Sense Self Regulation Model [19].
Descriptive accounts of the varying relationship between knowl-
edge and response can only be advanced by exploring how such
effects are being generated.
Social influence seemed to play a key role. Witnesses typically
engaged in conversations with patients, other witnesses and health
care professionals, all of which appeared to influence behaviour
with the potential to both increase or decrease delay. Some
witness/patient interactions included shared decision-making
elements with most patients reluctant to engage EMS, suggesting
that compared to patients, witnesses’ threshold for initiating an
emergency response might be lower.
Our findings suggest several factors that offer promising
opportunities for the development of delay-reducing interventions,
some of which are discussed below. Key factors to target are
heuristics that can lead to swift behavioural performance.
Behavioural interventions might use unspecific and automatic
perceptions of ‘something is wrong’ as triggers for an immediate
and more focused appraisal for stroke using the FAST check list
[8]. This could potentially accelerate the initiation of the
appropriate response by the witness.
Furthermore, as stroke identification is complex, suspicion of
stroke could be linked with immediate contact of EMS. Evidence
suggests witnesses are mostly correct in their diagnosis when
suspecting stroke [3]. Action plans [27] to pre-specify calling EMS
upon suspecting stroke could decrease delay. Additionally, coping
planning [27] for probable behavioural tendencies (e.g. contacting
peers or non-EMS professionals) could be counteracted by
planning to immediately contact EMS on suspicion of stroke,
thereby ignoring competing behavioural options.
The social elements of witnessing stroke could be used by at-risk
patients to collaboratively plan [28] response patterns in the event
of stroke. Pre-specifying perceived stroke symptoms as triggers for
social interaction to immediately call EMS could interfere with
time consuming deliberation processes. Further intervention
targets might constitute strengthening of the link between
contacting EMS and positive outcomes in the short (e.g. quick
help) and long-term (e.g. better recovery chances) through
accessing effective treatments.
Factors Influencing Witness Response to Stroke
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The strengths of this paper are the focus on the key population
of stroke witnesses and the use of psychological theory to explore
factors relevant for determining response behaviours. The
limitations of this research are that the relative importance of
identified factors and their likely interactions cannot be de-
termined using qualitative methods. Moreover, the use of different
theoretical frameworks, might have uncovered additional impor-
tant factors not captured within the models employed in the
current analysis. Lastly, retrospective accounts of witness’ experi-
ence are prone to recall bias and the sample obtained for this study
might not be representative of the population of stroke witnesses.
Future research should include both explanatory and de-
scriptive frameworks to understand the process underlying delay.
Carefully unpacking witnesses’ behavioural response sequences
when encountering stroke and determining the factors important
for different response behaviours would further increase our
understanding. In addition, interactions between witnesses and
patients need to be assessed. The differences in processes and
determining factors between witnesses and patients need explora-
tion to understand common and distinct targets for appropriate
behavioural interventions. Lastly, given the overlap of stroke
symptoms with other health conditions and the significant risk of
co-morbidity in patients at-risk of stroke, research needs to
determine whether EMS responses should be advocated at the
symptom level (i.e. symptom X = seek care Z) or at the disease
level (i.e. symptom X indicates disease Y = seek care Z) [14].
Although seemingly similar, the two levels of focus would have
implications for stroke interventions and impact on how these
could be dovetailed with those for other conditions.
Customary calls for more education and awareness of stroke
should be supplemented with elaborations on the specific factors
that interventions should actively target. Focusing on the key
population of witnesses, the current study advances our cumulative
understanding of delay between stroke symptom onset and calling
EMS and suggests specific targets to maximise stroke response
efficiency.
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